Introductory Remarks for Session IV
There are good reasons to believe that much of the western part of the former Soviet Union is likely to remain for some time, a zone of instability:
- In the first place, the régimes in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine are unlikely in the long run to persist:
- All three countries are now too aware of, and dependent on the outside world, especially the West,
- All three have growing long- or short-term economic and social problems,
- Stable democracies are, however, unlikely to emerge quickly or easily from the carcasses of the present authoritarian systems:
- Few countries have managed on their own to make a smooth transition without relapses from dictatorship to democracy,
- The journey can be, to varying degrees, especially long and hard for Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, because of their weak institutions, and their weak traditions of cultural pluralism, and the separation of powers.
- None of the three countries can count on the promise of eventual EU membership to serve as an incentive, although the EU’s current offer to Ukraine of an Association Agreement, accompanied by free trade and, for the first time, the possibility of EU membership in the distant future, may eventually provide Ukraine with the push it needs.
- Ukraine is also likely to be the first to become a stable democracy because of its greater exposure to the West, the diversity of its population, and the effect of the Orange revolution.
- An additional cause of long term instability in the region is the fact that relations between the successor states of collapsed empires often tend to stay unsettled for lengthy periods after the break-up.
- The relationship between Russia and Ukraine is likely to remain difficult for the foreseeable future because of
- the Russian imperial tradition that conceives of Ukraine as being a part of Russia, and
- the Russian view that the inclusion of Ukraine is essential for the success of the Russian attempt to construct a zone of influence over other former Soviet states. The structures that Russia proposes, would give Russia control over the economies, the finances, and the defence of the other members, and accord Russia the right to intervene militarily in the other states to keep them in line. The Russian drive has been undertaken partly in response to the expansion eastward of NATO and the EU.
- Should Russia succeed in its aim, the re-establishment of Russian hegemony could:
- prolong the instability of the area,
- prevent the spread of democracy,
- divide Europe, and, by offending our consciences, make it impossible for the West to achieve reconciliation with Russia. We must recall that the Second World War and the Cold War each arose out of the West’s opposition to the attempt by the successive principal powers in the area, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, to dominate the East European states.
- Should Russia succeed in its aim, the re-establishment of Russian hegemony could:
In view of these factors, the West has to be prepared for a long term engagement in the area, if it wishes to contribute to stability in Eastern Europe, and to overcome the division of the continent.
The West has to recognize that treating relations with Ukraine as a function of its relationship with Russia can have negative consequences, both for Ukraine, and for the region as a whole. If we want an independent Ukraine, we have to treat her as such.
On the other hand, the long term independence and security of Ukraine depends on the development of a greater Russian perception of security on its Western flank, coupled with a growing acceptance of Euro-Atlantic values. This state of affairs can only be accomplished through the gradual integration of Russia into the Euro-Atlantic world.